Abstract-Contributory group key agreement protocols generate group keys based on contributions of all group members. Particularly appropriate for relatively small collaborative peer groups, these protocols are resilient to many types of attacks. Unlike most group key distribution protocols, contributory group key agreement protocols offer strong security properties such as key independence and perfect forward secrecy. This paper presents the first robust contributory key agreement protocol resilient to any sequence of group changes. The protocol, based on the Group Diffie-Hellman contributory key agreement, uses the services of a group communication system supporting Virtual Synchrony semantics. We prove that it provides both Virtual Synchrony and the security properties of Group Diffie-Hellman, in the presence of any sequence of (potentially cascading) node failures, recoveries, network partitions, and heals. We implemented a secure group communication service, Secure Spread, based on our robust key agreement protocol and Spread group communication system. To illustrate its practicality, we compare the costs of establishing a secure group with the proposed protocol and a protocol based on centralized group key management, adapted to offer equivalent security properties.
INTRODUCTION
M ANY collaborative settings such as audio and videoconferencing, white-boards, clustering, and replication applications, require services which are not provided by the current network infrastructure. A typical collaborative application operates as a peer group where members communicate via reliable many-to-many multicast, sometimes requiring reliable ordered message delivery. In some settings, group members must be aware of the exact (agreed upon) group membership. Since group communication systems provide these services, many collaborative applications use group communication systems (GCS) as the underlying messaging infrastructure.
Security is crucial for distributed and collaborative applications that operate in a dynamic network environment and communicate over insecure networks such as the Internet. Basic security services needed in such a group setting are largely the same as in point-to-point communication: data secrecy and integrity, and entity authentication. These services cannot be attained without secure, efficient, and robust group key management. Many critical applications (e.g., military and financial) require that all intragroup communication remain confidential. Consequently, not only sufficiently strong encryption must be used to protect intragroup messages, but the underlying group key management must also provide strong security guarantees.
Group keys can be viewed as a sequence of values sorted by time of use, with each key corresponding to a different "snapshot" of a group. A group key is changed whenever the group changes or a periodic rekey is needed. The strongest known security guarantees are key independence and perfect forward secrecy (PFS). Key independence states that a passive adversary-who, in the worst case, might know all group keys except one-cannot use its knowledge to discover the one key that is missing. PFS demands that the compromise of group members' long-term keys should not lead to the compromise of any previously used group keys (see [3] for formal definitions).
Contributory group key agreement protocols that compute a group key as a (usually, one-way) function of individual contributions from all members can provide both key independence and PFS properties. At the same time, contributory group key agreement presents a tough practical challenge: Its multiround nature must be reconciled with the possibility of crashes, partitions, and other events affecting group membership that can occur during the execution of the group key agreement. Therefore, this paper focuses on robust contributory group key agreement.
Group Key Management
Traditional centralized key management relies on a single fixed key server to generate and distribute keys to the group. This approach is not well-suited for group communication systems that guarantee continuous operation in any possible group subset and any arbitrary number of partitions in the event of network partitions or faults. Although a key server can be made constantly available and attack-resistant with the aid of various fault tolerance and replication techniques, it is very difficult (in a scalable and efficient manner) to make a centralized server present in every possible group subset. We note that centralized approaches work well in one-to-many multicast scenarios since a key server (or a set thereof) can support continued operation within an arbitrary partition as long as it includes the source.
The requirement to provide continued operation in an arbitrary partition can be overcome by dynamically selecting a group member to act as a group key server. However, most centralized key distribution protocols do not provide strong security properties such as key independence and PFS. These properties can only be provided if the key server maintains pairwise secure channels with each group member in order to distribute group keys. Although this approach seems appealing, each time a new key server comes into play, significant costs must be incurred to set up pairwise secure channels. In addition, this method has a disadvantage (common to all centralized fixed-server methods) in that it relies on a single entity to generate good (i.e., cryptographically strong) random keys.
Our approach is to use a fully distributed, contributory group key management algorithm where a group key is not selected by one entity, but instead, is a function of each group member's contribution. This avoids the issues with centralized trust, single point of failure (and attack), and the requirement to establish pairwise secret channels, and provides strong security properties such as forward and backward secrecy, key independence, and PFS [3] .
Goal and Contribution
Secure, robust, and efficient key management is critical for secure group communication. However, designing key management protocols that are robust and efficient in the presence of network and process faults is a big challenge. The goal of this work is to provide a robust and secure group communication that offers Virtual Synchrony (VS) [4] semantics. Our contribution is three-fold:
1. We present the first robust contributory key agreement protocols that are resilient to any finite (even cascading) sequence of events. Our protocols (basic and optimized) are based on Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) [5] key agreement. 2. We design a robust and secure group communication service by combining our robust key agreement with a reliable group communication service. We prove that the resulting system preserves the Virtual Synchrony properties as well as the security properties of GDH. 3. We provide an insight into the cost of adding security services to GCS, focusing on group key management costs. We describe the implementation of a secure group communication service-Secure Spread-based on our optimized robust key agreement protocol and the Spread [6] group communication system. We present experimental results measuring the delay incurred by a group installing a secure membership following group membership changes. The cost of establishing a secure group when our protocol is used is compared with the cost of establishing a secure group when a centralized key management protocol, modified such that it provides the same strong security properties as our group key agreement, is used. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We present our failure and security models in Section 2. Section 3 presents both the group communication service and the key agreement protocol used in designing the robust secure group communication service. We then describe our protocols in Sections 4 and 5 and provide implementation details and performance results in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Related work is overviewed in Section 8, and the paper concludes with a brief summary in Section 9.
FAILURE MODEL AND SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a distributed system composed of a group of processes executing on one or more CPUs and coordinating their actions by exchanging messages. Message exchange is achieved via asynchronous multicast and unicast. While messages can be lost, we assume that message corruption is masked by a lower layer. Any process can crash and recover. A crash of any component of a process (i.e., key agreement layer or the group communication system) is considered a process crash. We assume that the crash of one of any component is detected by all the other components and is treated as a process crash.
Due to congestion or outright failures, the network can be split into disconnected fragments. At the group communication layer, this is referred to as a partition. When a partition is repaired, disconnected components merge into a larger connected component; this is referred to at the group communication layer as a merge. While processes are in separate disconnected components, they cannot exchange messages. Since we are interested in a practical and reasonably efficient solution, we do not consider Byzantine failures in this work.
We do not assume authenticity of membership events. Authentication of new members is obtained as part of group key management. When members leave, no explicit authentication of their departure is obtained. Furthermore, we do not assume any access control mechanisms to enforce membership policies, if any. We recognize that such mechanisms are necessary in real group applications; their development is the subject of recent and ongoing work [7] , [8] , [9] .
Our adversary model takes into account only outside adversaries, both passive and active. An outsider is anyone who is not a current group member. Any former or future member is an outsider according to this definition. We do not consider insider attacks, as our focus is on the secrecy of group keys and the integrity of group membership. The latter means the inability to spoof authenticated membership. Consequently, insider attacks are not relevant in this context since a malicious insider can always reveal the group key or its own private key, thus allowing for fraudulent membership.
Passive outsider attacks involve eavesdropping with the aim of discovering the group key(s). Active outsider attacks involve injecting, deleting, delaying, and modifying protocol messages. Some of these attacks aim to cause denial of service and we do not address them. Attacks that aim to impersonate a group member are prevented by the use of public key signatures. Every protocol message is signed by its sender and verified by all receivers. Other more subtle active attacks aim to introduce a known (to the attacker) or old key. These attacks are prevented by the combined use of timestamps, unique protocol message identifiers. and sequence numbers which identify the particular protocol run. This modification of GDH was formally proven secure against active adversaries in [10] , [11] .
PROBLEM DEFINITION
Our goal is to design a secure group communication service by combining a robust key agreement algorithm with a reliable group communication system (GCS). We define the semantics provided by the GCS and overview the GDH key agreement protocol suite, both of which are used later in the paper.
Group Communication Service
A GCS provides two important services: group membership and dissemination, reliability, and ordering of messages. The membership service notifies the application of the current list of group members every time the group changes. The output of this notification is called a view.
Several different group communication models [12] , [13] have been defined in the literature, each providing a different set of semantics to the application. Many communication models claim to offer Virtual Synchrony or some variant thereof. Such claims are often based on a loose definition of Virtual Synchrony stating that: Processes moving together from one view to another deliver the same set of messages in the former view. However, not all the models offer the same set of properties and, to the best of our knowledge, a canonical "Virtual Synchrony (VS) Model" has not been defined in the literature. A good survey of many flavors of virtual synchrony semantics can be found in [14] .
The ordering and reliability guarantees are provided within a view. In order to specify when the ordering and delivery properties are met, GCS delivers to the application an additional notification referred to as a transitional signal. Additional information provided with the view by a GCS is what is referred to as the transitional set. This set represents the set of processes that continue together with the process to which the membership notification was delivered and allows processes to locally determine if a state transfer is required. Different transitional sets may be delivered with the same view at different processes.
One property of the VS model that also has relevance for security is the Sending View Delivery [14] property, which requires messages to be delivered in the same view they were sent in. This enables the use of a shared view-specific key to encrypt data, since the receiver is guaranteed to have the same view as the sender and, therefore, the same key. To satisfy Sending View Delivery without discarding messages from group members, a GCS must block the sending of messages before the new view is installed [15] . This is achieved as follows: When a group membership change occurs, the GCS sends a message, flush request, to the application asking for permission to install a new view. The application must respond with a flush acknowledgment message which follows all the messages sent by the application in the old view. After sending the acknowledgment, the application is not allowed to send any message until the new view is delivered.
Virtual Synchrony Semantics
The GCS is assumed to support VS semantics as defined below. This set of properties is largely based on the survey in [14] and the definition of related semantics in [12] and [16] .
We define that some event occurred in view v at process p if the most recent view installed by process p before the event was v. 
GDH Contributory Key Agreement Protocol
GDH IKA.2 [5] is an extension of the 2-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [17] to groups. The shared key is never transmitted over the network, even in encrypted form. Instead, a set of partial keys (that are used by individual members to compute the group secret) is sent. One particular member, group controller, is charged with the task of building and distributing the set. This is done by passing a token between the members of the group to collect contributions of the new members. The group controller is not fixed and has no special security privileges. The protocol works as follows: When a merge event occurs, the current controller refreshes its own contribution to the group key (to prevent any incoming members from discovering the old group key), generates a new token, and passes it to one of the new members. When the chosen new member receives the token, it adds its own contribution and then passes the token to the next new member. 2 Eventually, the token reaches the last new member. This new member, who is slated to become the new controller, broadcasts the token to the group without adding its contribution. Upon receiving the broadcast token, each group member (old and new) factors out its contribution and unicasts the result (called a factor-out token) to the new controller. The new controller collects all the factor-out tokens, adds its own contribution to each of them, builds the set of partial keys, and broadcasts it to the group. Every member can then obtain the group key by factoring in its contribution.
When some of the members leave the group, the controller (who, at all times, is the most recent remaining group member) removes their corresponding partial keys from the set of partial keys, refreshes each partial key in the set, and broadcasts the set to the group. Every remaining member can then compute the shared key. Note that, if the current controller leaves the group, the newest remaining member becomes the group controller.
BASIC ROBUST ALGORITHM
This section discusses the details of a basic robust group key agreement algorithm (GKA). We describe the algorithm and prove its correctness, i.e., we show that it preserves virtual synchrony semantics presented in Section 3.1. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we use the term GCS to mean a group communication system providing virtual synchrony semantics.
Algorithm Description
The GDH IKA.2 protocol, briefly presented in Section 3.2, is secure and correct. Security is preserved independently of any sequence of membership events, while correctness holds only as long as no additional group view change takes place before the protocol terminates. To elaborate further, consider what happens if a leave or partition event occurs while the protocol is in progress, e.g., while the group controller is waiting for individual unicasts from all group members. Since the GDH protocol does not incorporate a membership protocol (including a fault-detection mechanism), it is not aware of the membership change and the group controller does not proceed until all factor-out tokens (including those from departed members) are collected. Therefore, the system simply blocks. Similar scenarios are also possible if one of the new members crashes while adding its contribution to a group key. In this case, the token never reaches the new group controller and the GDH protocol, once again, blocks.
If the nested event is additive (join or merge), the protocol operates correctly. In other words, it runs to completion and the nested event is handled serially. However, this is not optimal since, ideally, multiple additive events ought to be "chained," effectively reducing broadcasts and factor-out token implosions. As the above examples illustrate, the GDH protocol does not operate correctly in the face of certain cascaded membership events (specifically, when the interrupting events are subtractive events). This behavior basically violates the high degree of robustness and fault tolerance of the GCS.
We propose a basic solution as follows: Each time a membership change occurs, the group deterministically selects a member (say, the oldest) to initiate the GDH merge protocol. The algorithm uses the membership service to consistently choose that member and the FIFO and Agreed ordering services to ensure that, if one member installs a secure view, all other members eventually install the same view. The approach we propose is twice as expensive in computation and requires OðnÞ more messages for the common case with no cascading membership events, n being the group size. We discuss it because it is simpler and it allows us to show algorithm correctness with respect to the group communication semantics and stated security goals. In Section 5, we present an optimized algorithm that offers better performance and uses the basic algorithm as a "subroutine" in exceptional cases.
Since the output of the algorithm is a secure GCS, VS semantics as defined in Section 3.1 must be preserved. To achieve this, our algorithm takes extra care to provide delivery of the correct views, transitional signal, and transitional sets to the applications, as well as the list of connected group members.
We model the algorithm as a state machine (see Fig. 2 ), where transitions from one state to another take place based on the event that occurred. An event is defined as receiving a particular type of message. In Fig. 2 , all transitions numbered with the same number denote the same set of events and actions for that particular state. The following types of messages are used: GDH messages (see [18] ) (partial_to ken_msg, final_token_msg, key_ list_msg, fact_out_msg); membership notification messages (memb_msg); transitional signal messages (trans_ signal_msg); data messages (data_msg); flush mechanism messages (flush_request_msg, flush_ok_msg). Fig. 1 presents the secure GCS protocol stack. Our group key agreement (GKA) protocol interacts with both the application and GCS and implements the blocking mechanism as follows: When a flush_request_msg message is received from GCS, it is delivered to the application. When the application acknowledgment message is received, it is sent down to the GCS.
A process starts executing the algorithm by invoking the join primitive of the key agreement module, which translates into a GCS join call. In any state of the algorithm, a process can voluntarily leave by invoking the leave primitive of the key agreement module, which translates into a GCS leave call.
The set of events that can trigger transitions from one state to another are presented in Table 1 . The events are associated with a specific group and are received by the GKA. Note that both User_Message and Data_Message events are associated with a data_msg message received by the GKA, but, in the first case, the source of the message is an application, while, in the second case, the source is the GCS. Also note that all messages specific to the GDH protocol are particular cases of data_msg. We define specific messages and associate events with them to simplify the description of the protocol.
Each state of the algorithm (in Fig. 2 ) is described by three types of events: events that trigger transitions, events that are considered illegal (in which case, an error is returned to the application), and events that should not occur when the algorithm operates correctly. The following states are used: process is waiting for membership and transitional signal messages; possible events are: Membership, Transitional_Signal, Data_Message (possible only the first time the process gets in this state), Partial_Token, Final_Token, Fact_Out, and Key_List (they correspond to GDH messages from a previous instance of the GKA when cascaded events happen); User_Message and Secure_Flush_Ok are illegal. The state machine is built around the CM state, which is used to restart the protocol. Four other states are just a map of the GDH merge protocol and are used to pass the token accumulating contributions and used to build the set of partial keys. The S state is the operational state. The pseudocode corresponding to the state machine from Fig. 2 and the correctness proofs are presented in Appendix 1 which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://computer.org/tpds/archives.htm.
Security Considerations
The GDH protocol was proven secure against passive adversaries in [5] . As evident from the state machine in Fig. 2 , the protocol remains intact, i.e., all protocol messages are sent and delivered in the same order as specified in [5] . More precisely, with no cascaded events, our protocol is exactly the same as the original GDH join protocol [5] . In the case of a cascaded event, the protocol is the same as the IKA.2 [5] group key agreement protocol. Since both of these protocols are proven secure, our robust protocol is, therefore, also provably secure. In this context, security means that it is computationally infeasible to compute a group key by passively observing any number of protocol messages. As discussed in Section 2, stronger, active attacks are averted by the combined use of timestamps, protocol message type, and protocol run identifiers, explicit inclusion of message source and destination and, most importantly, digital signatures by the source of the message. These measures make it impossible for the active adversary to impersonate a group member or to interfere with the key agreement protocol and thereby influence or compute the eventual group key [10] , [11] .
AN OPTIMIZED ROBUST ALGORITHM
In this section, we show how the algorithm presented in the previous section can be optimized, resulting in lower-cost handling of common, noncascaded events, while preserving the same set of group communication and security guarantees.
Algorithm Description
The basic algorithm presented in Section 4 is robust even when cascaded group events occur. Every time a membership notification is delivered by the GCS, the algorithm "forgets" all previous key agreement information (i.e., the set of partial keys) and restarts the merge protocol, selecting a member from the new group to initialize it. Thus, this algorithm costs more than necessary since it does not attempt to use the existing accumulated information (partial keys) and avoid unnecessary computation.
We propose to improve the basic protocol by using optimized protocols for each type of group change (join, leave, partition, merge, or a combination of partition and merge) and by taking advantage of the already existing set of partial keys. We also utilize the basic algorithm to handle more complex cascaded membership events. For example, in case of a leave, the leave protocol is invoked, which requires the group controller to remove the leaving member(s) from the set, refresh the set of partial keys, and broadcast it. Thus, leave events can be handled immediately, with lower communication and computation costs than those of the basic algorithm. In Section 5.2, we discuss how a combined event-including both joins and leaves-can be handled by a modified version of the GDH merge protocol.
The optimized algorithm is modeled by a state machine that, in addition to the states in the basic algorithm, uses two more states, as shown in Fig. 3 . Each state is described by three types of events: events that trigger transitions, events that should never occur when the algorithm operates correctly, and events that are considered illegal:
. WAIT_FOR_SELF_JOIN (SJ): initial state wherein a process that joins a group enters the state machine; the process is waiting for the membership message that notifies the group about its joining. In case a network event happens between the join request and the membership notification delivery, the GCS will report a network event and the transitional set will contain only the joining member; possible event is Membership; User_Message and Secure_Flush_Ok are illegal. . WAIT_FOR_MEMBERSHIP (M): process is waiting for a membership notification; possible events are: Transitional_Signal, Data_Message, and Membership; User_Message and Secure_Flush_Ok events are illegal. While a process starts the basic algorithm in the CM state, in the optimized algorithm, a process starts the algorithm in state SJ, by invoking the Join primitive. At any time, a process can voluntarily leave the algorithm by invoking the Leave primitive. The main difference between the robust and the optimized algorithm is that, in case of a membership change, the process moves to the M state and tries to handle the event depending on its nature (subtractive, additive, or both). In case of cascading memberships, everything is abandoned and the basic algorithm is invoked by moving to the CM state.
The pseudocode corresponding to the state machine from Fig. 3 and the corectness proofs are presented in Appendix 2 which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://computer.org/tpds/archives.htm.
Handling Bundled Events
Most group events are homogeneous in nature: leave (partition) or join (merge) of one or more members. However, a GCS can decide to bundle several such events if they occur within a very short time interval. The main incentive for doing so is to reduce the impact and overhead on the application.
Recall that GDH defines two separate protocols for leave and merge. Each of them can trivially handle bundled events of the same type: The GDH merge protocol can accommodate any combination of bundled merges, while the GDH leave protocol can do the same for any combination of partitions. A more interesting scenario is when a single membership event bundles merges/joins with leaves/partitions. One way to handle such an event is to first invoke GDH leave to process all leaves/partitions and then invoke GDH merge to process joins/merges. However, this is inefficient since the group would perform two separate key agreement protocols where only one is truly needed. Since both GDH protocols are initiated by the group controller, we propose the following optimized solution. After processing all leaves/partitions, the group controller can suppress the usual broadcast of new partial keys and, instead, forward the resulting set to the first merging/joining member thereby initiating a merge protocol. This saves an extra round of broadcast and at least one cryptographic operation for each member. 
Security Considerations
Recall that, in the merge protocol, the current controller begins by refreshing its contribution (to the group key) and forwarding the result to the first merging member. This message actually contains a set of partial keys, one for each "old" member and an extra partial key for the first new member. This message is also signed by the controller and includes the list of all members believed by the controller to be in the group at that instant. In the optimized protocol, the controller effectively suppresses all partial keys corresponding to members who are leaving the group. This modification changes nothing as far as any outside attacks or threats are concerned. The only issue of interest is whether any members leaving the group can obtain the new key. We claim that this is impossible since the set of partial keys forwarded by the controller is essentially the same as the partial key set broadcast in the normal leave protocol. Therefore, former members are no better off in the optimized than in the leave protocol. Also, the new (merging) members are still unable to compute any prior group keys just as in the plain merge protocol. This is because the information available to the new members in the optimized protocol is identical to that in the plain merge.
IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the optimized algorithm described above using the Spread [6] GCS and the Cliques key agreement library. In this section, we overview the Spread and Cliques toolkits and present the concrete outcome of this work, the Secure Spread library.
The Spread Toolkit
Spread [6] is a general-purpose GCS for wide and local-area networks, where any group member can be both a sender and a receiver. Although designed to support small to medium-size groups, it can accommodate a large number of collaboration sessions, each spanning the Internet.
The main services provided by the system are reliable and ordered delivery of messages (FIFO, causal, total/ Agreed order, safe) and a membership service in a model that considers benign network and computer faults (crashes, recoveries, partitions and merges). Spread supports two well-known semantics, Virtual Synchrony (VS) [13] , [16] and Extended Virtual Synchrony (EVS) [12] , [19] . In this work, we use only the latter.
The Spread toolkit is publicly available and is being used by several organizations in research, educational, and production settings. It supports cross-platform applications and has been ported to several Unix platforms as well as to Windows and Java environments.
The Cliques Toolkit
Cliques is a cryptographic toolkit providing key management services for dynamic peer groups. The toolkit assumes the existence of a communication platform for transporting protocol messages and maintaining group membership. It includes several protocol suites: GDH, CKD, TGDH [20] , STR [21] , [22] , and BD [23] . GDH is based on group extensions of the 2-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange [5] and provides fully contributory group key agreement. TGDH, STR, and BD are Diffie-Hellman-based protocols that make different trade offs of communication and computation.
All Cliques protocol suites offer key independence, perfect forward secrecy, and resistance to known key attacks. (See [3] for precise definitions of these properties.) In this paper, we focus only on the GDH protocol suite within the Cliques toolkit.
The Secure Spread Library
The Secure Spread library provides client data confidentiality and integrity. It is built on top of the VS Spread client library; it uses Spread as its communication infrastructure and Cliques [18] library for key management. The core of the library is the Client Agreement Module, which is the connection between the library and the GCS. When it receives a notification from GCS about a group membership change, the module starts the key agreement protocol. When the key agreement protocol completes and a new key is available, the module delivers a secure group membership change notification to the application.
The library has two components: Key Agreement Selector and Encryption Selector that allow, respectively, the selection of a specific key agreement module and a specific encryption module.
Secure Spread currently has two different modules for key agreement, both using primitives provided by the Cliques library: the robust optimized GDH protocol (presented in this paper) and a centralized key management protocol (described below), both having the same security properties. The architecture allows each group to run its own key agreement protocol. The library uses Blowfish for encryption.
Centralized Key Distribution Protocol
In general, centralized key distribution protocols do not provide key independence since, for efficiency reasons, they rely on previous group or subgroup keys to distribute new 3. Actually, the Flush library provides all the properties we described in Section 3.1 but one. It does not deliver exactly one transitional signal per view. However, in the Flush library the Flush_Request and Transitional_Signal events are delivered in AGREED order. Using this property, with a minor modification, our GKA can avoid generating unnecessary transitional signals for the application. keys. When using such a method, the compromise of some group keys can lead to the compromise of other group keys. To compare protocols having the same security properties, we designed a Centralized Key Distribution (CKD) scheme that provides the same level of security as GDH, as far as key independence and PFS [3] .
The group secret is always generated by one member, the current group controller. 4 Following each membership change, the controller generates a new secret and distributes it securely to the group. Of course, an efficient symmetric cipher can be used to securely distribute the group key. However, the resulting security properties would differ from those of our key agreement protocol, which relies solely on the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption [24] and the Discrete Logarithm Problem [3] . Therefore, to provide an equivalent level of security, we encrypt the group key via modular exponentiation.
The controller in CKD is always the oldest member. Regardless of the group operation, the CKD protocol consists of two phases (see also Algorithm 1):
1. Each group member and the controller agree on a unique pairwise key using authenticated two-party Diffie-Hellman. This key does not need to change as long as both users remain in the group. If the controller leaves the group, the new controller has to perform this operation with every member. If a regular member leaves, the controller simply discards this pairwise key. 2. The group controller unilaterally generates and distributes the group secret.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the GDH key agreement protocol with the CKD protocol presented in Section 6.4, in a LAN environment. We evaluate the time it takes the system to establish secure membership for the most common group events: join and leave. Cryptography relies on expensive exponentiations, so it seems that measuring CPU time will be a good approach demonstrating the cryptographic overhead. Table 2 presents the number of serial exponentiations for a join or leave event, where n is the group size before the operation, while m and p represent the number of new and partitioned members, respectively. A more relevant measure for a GCS is the latency that a user experiences from the moment the group change was detected until the new secure group is established. This time is greater than just the analytical cryptographic cost since it includes network latency. It can also exhibit increased computation cost if several processes compete for the same CPU.
Our experimental testbed is a cluster of 13 667 MHz Pentium III dual-processor PCs running Linux. Each machine runs a Spread server, while group members are uniformly distributed on the machines. Therefore, more than one process can be running on a single machine (which is frequent in many collaborative applications).
Each member measures the time it took to complete the key agreement and establish a secure view. We compute the average cost of the membership service and secure membership with GDH and CKD, respectively. This time was averaged over 20 distinct runs of the experiment.
Since CKD is particularly expensive if the current controller leaves the group, we take this into account by considering that, with 1=n probability, the member leaving the group is the group controller.
Experiments performed on our testbed for the insecure GCS show that the average cost of sending and delivering one agreed multicast message is almost constant, ranging
50 members. We use 1,024-bit RSA signatures for message origin and data authentication, with the public exponent of 3 to reduce the verification overhead. On our hardware platform, the RSA sign and verify operations take 9:6 and 0:2 milliseconds, respectively. For the short-term group key, we use both 512 and 1,024-bit Diffie-Hellman parameter p and 160-bit q. The cost of a single exponentiation is 1:7 and 5:3 milliseconds for a 512 and a 1,024-bit modulus, respectively.
Figs. 5 and 6 present the respective costs of:
1. our robust GDH key agreement protocol, 2. the centralized protocol (CKD), and 3. the insecure group communication membership service. Note that the cost of the membership service is insignificant when compared to key agreement overhead.
For join (Fig. 5) , the contributory protocol is more expensive than CKD. For example, for a group of 20 members, the time to install a secure membership is about 142 milliseconds for the contributory protocol, while, for the centralized protocol, it is about 91 milliseconds, when the 512-bit modulus is used. The difference between CKD and GDH comes from exponentiation and signature verifications: extra operations in GDH include n verifications, one RSA signature, and one modular exponentiation.
For leave events (see Fig. 6 ), the centralized protocol is more expensive. For the 512-bit modulus, for a group of 20 members, it takes about 49 milliseconds to establish secure membership with the contributory protocol, while the centralized protocol takes about 58 milliseconds. The overhead of the centralized protocol over the contributory protocol comes from one exponentiation, plus the cost of establishing n À 1 secure channels if the leaving member is the group controller.
Both protocols scale linearly with group size in the number of exponentiations. Performance deteriorates when 1,024-bit modulus is used for shared key generation, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we consider related work in group key management and reliable group communication. 
Group Key Management
Cryptographic techniques for securing all types of multicast or group-based protocols require all parties to share a common key. This requires a group key management protocol to generate new group keys and update existing keys. Group key management protocols generally fall into two classes:
. Protocols designed for large-scale (e.g., IP Multicast) groups, with a one-to-many communication paradigm and relatively weak security requirements [25] , [26] . Most of such protocols are centralized key distribution schemes. . Protocols designed to support medium size tightly coupled dynamic peer groups, with a many-to-many communication paradigm and strong security requirements [23] , [5] . Both distributed group key distribution and group key agreement methods are applicable to such settings. Many protocols of the first type are being developed in the context of IETF/IRTF: Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [25] , Multicast Key Management Protocol (MKMP) [27] , Scalable Multicast Key Distribution [28] , the Intradomain Group Key Management work of [26] , One-way Function Trees [29] , Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP) [30] , GSAKMP-light [31] , Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) [32] , while [33] defines an architecture for large scale group key management. Since the focus of our work is on dynamic peer groups key management, we discuss only distributed group key distribution and contributory key agreement protocols.
Most group key agreement schemes [5] , [22] , [23] , [20] , [34] , [21] extend the well-known Diffie-Hellman key exchange [17] method to groups of n parties. Steer et al. proposed a group key agreement protocol [22] for static conferencing. While the protocol is well-suited for adding new group members as it takes only two rounds and two modular exponentiations, it is relatively expensive when excluding members. In 1994, Burmester and Desmedt [23] proposed an efficient protocol that takes only three rounds and three modular exponentiations per member to generate a group key. This protocol allows all members to recompute the group key for any membership change with a constant small CPU cost. However, it requires 2n broadcast messages, which can be expensive on a wide area network. Tzeng and Tzeng also proposed an elegant authenticated key agreement scheme based on secure multiparty computation [34] . Their protocol is optimized in terms of communication rounds, but also uses 2n simultaneous broadcast messages. The resulting group key does not provide PFS, which represents a major drawback.
Steiner et al. address dynamic membership issues [5] in group key agreement and propose a family of protocols based on straight forward extensions of the two-party Diffie-Hellman protocol. Their protocol suite is fairly efficient in leave and partition operation, but the merge protocol requires as many rounds as the number of new members to complete key agreement. The entire protocol suite has been proven secure with respect to both passive and active attacks. Follow-on work yielded more efficient protocols in either communication or computation [20] , [21] .
Dynamic group key distribution methods are also amenable to dynamic peer groups. Centralized Key Distribution (CKD) is a simple example of distributed key distribution (see Section 6.4), where the oldest group member acts as a key distribution center and, in the event of a partition or a leave of the center, the role shifts to the oldest remaining member. Rodeh et al. proposed more advanced key distribution protocols, combining a key tree structure with dynamic key server election [35] or taking advantage of efficient data structures such as AVL trees [36] . Although they have some of the disadvantages of key distribution schemes, the communication and computation costs are appreciably lower than those in CKD.
Reliable Group Communication
Reliable group communication in LAN environments has a long history beginning with ISIS [37] , and more recent systems such as Transis [38] , Horus [39] , Totem [40] , and RMP [41] . These systems explored several different models of group communication such as Virtual Synchrony [4] and Extended Virtual Synchrony [12] . More recent work in this area focuses on scaling group membership to wide-area networks [42] , [43] . Research on securing group communication is fairly new. The only implementations of GCS that focus on security (in addition to ours) are the SecureRing [44] project at UCSB, the Horus/Ensemble work at Cornell [35] , and the Rampart system at AT&T [45] .
Some GCSs (Rampart and SecureRing) address Byzantine failures. They suffer from limited performance since they use costly protocols and rely intensively on public key cryptography. Rampart builds the group multicast protocols over a secure group membership protocol, while SecureRing system protects a low-level ring by authenticating each transmission of the token and data message received.
The Ensemble work is state-of-the-art in secure reliable group communication. It allows application-dependent trust models and optimizes certain aspects of the group key generation and distribution protocols. Ensemble achieves data confidentiality by using a shared group key obtained by means of group key distribution protocols. In comparison with our approach, although efficient, the scheme does not provide forward secrecy, key independence, and PFS.
Some other approaches focus on building highly configurable dynamic distributed protocols. Cactus [46] is a framework that allows the implementation of configurable protocols as composition of microprotocols. Survivability of the security services is enhanced by using redundancy [47] .
Another toolkit that can be used to build secure group oriented applications is Enclaves [48] . It provides group control and communication (both unicast and multicast) and data confidentiality. The system uses a centralized key distribution scheme where a member of the group (group leader) selects a new key every time the group changes and securely distributes it to all group members. The main drawback of the system is that it does not address failure recovery when the leader of the group fails.
Antigone [49] is a framework that provides mechanisms which allow flexible application security policies. The system implements group rekeying mechanisms in two flavors: session rekeying-all group members receive a new key, and session key distribution-the session leader transmits an existing session key. Both schemes present problems, distributing the same key when the group We use several simple procedures:
• alone: given a list of all members of a group, it returns TRUE if the process invoking it is the only member of the group, FALSE otherwise;
• ready: given a key list message, it returns TRUE when the list is ready to be broadcast (it contains all the partial keys), FALSE otherwise;
• last: given a list and a name of a process, it returns TRUE if the process is the last one on the GDH list, FALSE otherwise;
• is in: given an item and a list, returns TRUE if the list contains the item, FALSE otherwise;
• empty: given a list, returns TRUE if the list is empty, FALSE otherwise;
• choose: given a list, deterministically chooses a member on the list and returns that member;
• -: the subtraction operator for list;
We also use some important data structures. The Membership data structure keeps information regarding a membership notifi cation: October 26, 2003 DRAFT
• mb id, the unique identifi er of the view;
• mb set, the list of all the members of this view;
• vs set, the transitional set associated with this notifi cation;
• merge set, the members from the new view that are not in the transitional set of the new view;
• leave set, the members from the previous view that are not in the transitional set of the new view.
GCS-s usually provide only the fi rst three pieces of information in a membership notifi cation.
The merge set and leave set can be computed by either the GKA or the GCS by using the membership set of the previous membership notifi cation, and the current membership notifi cation.
To simplify the presentation of the pseudo-code of the algorithm we assume that the merge set and leave set are provided by the GCS as part of the membership notifi cation 5 . For communication, we use the FIFO service to send all of the protocol messages, with the exception of the list of the partial keys for which we used the AGREED service. We choose to use a more expensive service for the last broadcast to reduce the complexity of the algorithm and the proofs.
Algorithm 2 Initialization of global variables

A. Correctness Proof
We now prove that the above algorithm preserves the Virtual Synchrony Model described in Section III-A.
In the following, the term secure membership notification denotes a notifi cation delivered by the GKA to the application. The term VS membership notification denotes a notifi cation delivered by the GCS to the GKA. A secure view is a view installed by the GKA and a VS view is a view installed by the GCS. The following two lemmas are obvious from the algorithm description and they represent the flush mechanisms properties.
Lemma 1.1:
The GKA blocks an application from sending messages between the time a secure flush ok msg message was sent and the delivery of the new secure membership.
Lemma 1.2:
When a group membership change occurs, the GKA delivers a flush request msg message to processes already part of the group. The new secure membership is delivered only after they answer with a secure flush ok message. For a joining process no flush req is delivered and the secure membership is the fi rst message delivered to it.
We now prove the following lemmas. Proof: By the Flush Acknowledgment property of the GCS, a membership notifi cation delivery is preceded by the process sending a flush ok msg message, unless the process is joining.
By the algorithm, immediately after sending a flush ok msg message, the process transitions to the CM state and does not leave the CM state until it receives a Membership event. A joining process starts executing the algorithm in the CM state and does not leave it until it receives a membership event.
Lemma 1.4:
The only states where user messages are received by the GKA from the GCS The second transition corresponds to a Key List event occurrence in the KL state. In this case, at the time the new secure view is delivered, it indicates the VS group members list, and as GCS provides Self Inclusion, p is guaranteed to be on that list. In this case, when the secure view is delivered, it indicates the most recent VS identifi er.
1) Self Inclusion:
Theorem 1.1: When process p installs a secure view, the view includes p.
Proof: This holds due to Lemma 1.5. In the S state, the secure view is the most recent VS view (by Lemma 1.5), so by Sending View Delivery of GCS, the theorem holds.
As specifi ed by the algorithm, a process moves to the CM state after the application agreed to close the membership by sending a flush ok message (see Algorithm 3). Since the GKA delivers a message immediately after it was received and GCS provides Sending View Delivery, all the messages sent in a VS view will be delivered before the next VS view was received, and therefore, before a new secure view is installed. • GKA sends m immediately after it was sent by the application.
• GCS delivers message m causally after it was sent (Delivery Integrity).
• GKA delivers m immediately after it was received from the GCS.
5) No Duplication:
Theorem 1.5: A message is sent only once using the GKA. A message is delivered only once to the same process by the GKA.
Proof: By the algorithm, an application can send messages only in the S state, so a message is sent only once. Also, messages are delivered only in the S and CM states, immediately upon receipt from the GCS. Since GCS guarantees no duplication, the theorem holds. The GKA generates GDH messages, but these are never delivered to the application so they do not affect the No Duplication property. Proof: By the algorithm, a message is sent by the application via the GCS, the GKA never discards application messages and it delivers them immediately after receiving them. Since GCS provides Self Delivery, the theorem is true.
7) Transitional Set:
Theorem 1.7: Every process is part of its transitional set for a secure view v sec.
Proof: This is true by the protocol (the way the transitional set is computed for a secure view), and by the Self Inclusion property of the GCS. To show that q installed no intermediary secure views, the same proof is repeated reversing p and q's roles with the additional information that p is in q's secure transitional set because of the way the set is computed and GCS Transitional Set property number two.
Theorem 1.9:
If two processes p and q install the same secure view, and q is included in p's transitional set for this view, then p is included in q's transitional set for this view.
Proof: Assume p and q install the same secure view, q is included in p's transitional set for this view, but p is not included in q's transitional set for this view. Two cases are possible.
First, q's previous secure view was not the same as p's secure view. In this case, by theorem 1.8, q is not included in p's transitional set, contradicting our assumption.
Second, q's previous secure view was the same, but an intermediary VS notifi cation delivered to q did not include p in its transitional set. Since p and q install the same secure view, it must be that p and q install the same VS view at some point. The fi rst such view installed at q preserves that p is not in q's transitional set by GCS Transitional Set property number one. By GCS Transitional Set property number two, p must not have q in its transitional set for that view.
By the protocol, then q is removed from p's secure transitional set, and because p's transitional set never grows q will not be in p's secure transitional set when p and q install the new secure view, which contradicts our assumption. By the way we compute the transitional set), if process p and q move together from v1 sec to v2 sec, then p and q moved together through the sequence of VS views v1 to v1 1 , ..., v1 n−1 to v1 n , v1 n to v2 6 . Therefore, by the GCS Virtual Synchrony, processes p and q deliver the same set of messages between v1 and v1 1 , v1 1 and v1 2 , ... v1 n and v2. No other messages are delivered between v2 and v2 sec installations because any such message has to be sent in v2
according to the GCS Sending View Delivery property.
By the protocol, upon sending the flush ok msg message that concludes v1 each process moves to the CM state and will not send data messages before installing v2 sec. In particular, it will not send messages between v2 and v2 sec. Therefore, p and q deliver the same set of messages in v1 sec.
9) FIFO, Causal, Agreed and Safe Delivery:
Lemma 1.7: All the user messages delivered by the GCS are immediately delivered by the GKA, maintaining the ordering properties indicated by the GCS delivery for each message.
Proof: By the protocol, the messages delivered by a process in secure view v sec, are messages delivered by the GCS in a VS view v. Since messages are delivered to the application in the order they were received from the GCS, without being delayed, no application messages are dropped or duplicated, and no phantom messages are generated, the messages delivered in v sec, support the same ordering requirements as they were delivered in v. If messages m and m are delivered by process p in secure view v1 sec in this order, and m is delivered by process q in secure view v2 sec and message m was sent by a process r which is a member of secure view v2 sec, then q delivered m.
Proof: This is true by Lemma 1.7 and because the secure transitional set is the intersection of all the VS transitional sets.
Theorem 1.14:
If process p delivers a safe message m in secure view v sec before the transitional signal, then every process q of v sec delivers m unless it crashes.
If process p delivers a safe message m in secure view v sec after the transitional signal, then every process q that belongs to p's transitional set delivers m after the transitional signal unless it crashes.
Proof: The claims are true because the GKA delivers messages with the same ordering guarantees with which they were delivered by the GCS (by Lemma 1.7), the fi rst transitional signal received from GCS is delivered to the application and because the secure transitional set is the intersection of all the VS transitional sets. The description of the protocol we use two additional fi elds (merge set and leave set) of the membership notifi cation to determine the cause of the group view change. In addition, we use a modifi ed version of the procedure clq update key that can handle combined network events.
A. Correctness Proof
The proof that the optimized algorithm described above provides the virtual synchrony semantics presented in Section III-A is very similar to the proof we provided for the basic algorithm. There are some differences in the optimized algorithm: 1) secure memberships can be installed in three states, CM, SJ and M; 2) application messages are delivered in the S and M states; 3) membership notifi cations are received from the GCS in the CM, SJ, and M states; 4) a process is not allowed to send user messages while performing the GKA , therefore a process can not send user messages in any of the SJ, M, CM, PT, FT, FO, or KL states.
Using a reasoning similar to the one we used in the proof for the basic algorithm, the following lemmas can be proved.
Lemma 2.1:
The only states where VS membership notifi cations are received are the SJ, CM and M states.
Lemma 2.2:
The only states where user messages can be received are S and M. User messages are delivered to the application only in the S and M states.
All the Virtual Synchrony Model properties described in Section III-A can be proven by using the above lemmas and the properties provided by the underlying GCS. We exemplify this, by proving the Virtual Synchrony property. Due to the similarity with the proofs we presented for the basic algorithm, we do not include a proof for each property.
1) Virtual Synchrony:
Theorem 2.1: Two processes p and q that move together through two consecutive secure views, deliver the same set of messages in the former view.
Proof: User messages are delivered to the application only in the S and M states (Lemma 2.2) and VS membership notifi cations are received only in the SJ, CM and M states ( Lemma 2.1).
By the way we compute the transitional set, if process p and q move together from v1 sec to v2 sec, then they moved together through the sequence of VS views v1 to v1 1 , ..., v1 n−1 to v1 n , v1 n to v2. If n is zero, v2 will be received in the M state, otherwise, v1 1 is received in the M state and all other possible VS views (including v2) will be received in the CM state. Therefore, by the GCS Virtual Synchrony property, processes p and q deliver the same set of messages between v1 and v1 1 , v1 1 and v1 2 , ... v1 n and v2. No other messages are delivered between v2
and v2 sec installations because any such message has to be sent in v2 by the GCS Sending View Delivery property.
By the protocol, upon sending the flush ok msg message that concludes v1 each process moves to the M state and will not send data messages before installing v2 sec. In particular, it will not send messages between v2 and v2 sec. Therefore, p and q deliver the same set of messages in 
